Public/private in higher education: a synthesis of economic and political approaches by Marginson, S
For Peer Review Only
 
 
 
 
 
 
Public/private in higher education: A synthesis of economic 
and political approaches 
 
 
Journal: Studies in Higher Education 
Manuscript ID CSHE-2015-0711.R1 
Manuscript Type: Article 
Keywords: 
Role of Higher Education, equality, neoliberalism, public policy, education 
market 
  
 
 
URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/cshe
Studies in Higher Education
For Peer Review Only
Public/private in higher education:  
A synthesis of economic and political approaches 
 
Abstract 
 
The public/private distinction is central to higher education but there is no consensus on 
‘public’. In neo classical economic theory Samuelson distinguishes non market goods 
(public) that cannot be produced for profit, from market-based activity (private). This 
provides a basis for identifying the minimum necessary public expenditure, but does not 
effectively encompass collective goods, or normative elements. In political theory ‘public’ is 
often understood as state ownership and/or control. Dewey regards social transactions as 
‘public’ when they have relational consequences for persons other than those directly 
engaged, and so become matters of state concern. This is more inclusive than Samuelson but 
without limit on costs. Neither definition is wholly satisfactory, each offers something, and 
each can be used to critically interrogate the other. The article synthesizes the two 
approaches, applying the resulting analytical framework with four quadrants (civil society, 
social democracy, state quasi-market, commercial market) to higher education and research.  
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 2 
Introduction 
 
It is widely agreed that higher education contributes to the relational or public dimension 
of human society but there is little clarity on what this means and how it relates to the 
private benefits for students and graduates. Many claims are made by university leaders 
and ministers of education about the contributions of higher education institutions (HEIs) 
to the ‘common good’, ‘public interest’, ‘public good’, or ‘public goods’. Higher education 
institutions are said to provide opportunity for all on the basis of merit; widen the scope for 
upward social mobility; enhance the careers and lives of those they educate; contribute to 
productivity and prosperity by preparing graduates for occupations, and supplying 
innovations for industry; provide employment for cities and regions; create and distribute 
knowledge and ideas, and advance free expression; foster scientific literacy, and sustain 
intellectual conversations and artistic work; contribute to policy and government, and 
prepare citizens for democratic decision-making. HEIs are said to sustain a cosmopolitan 
outlook and growing cross-border traffic. They encourage ecological awareness, and find 
solutions to global problems. However, statements about the public benefits of higher 
education lack intellectual cut-through. They tend to read as solely normative and 
assumption driven. In contrast with private rates of return and employment, public benefits 
are rarely associated with plausible measures (Marginson, 2013a). Nor is the public 
dimension understood as a unified field with one definition of ‘public’ across the range of 
identified activities and effects.  
 
Obstacles to clarification of ‘public’ higher education 
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 3 
There are at least four reasons for the lack of clarity about the public/private distinction in 
higher education and elsewhere. First, public/private terminology is variously applied to 
the location of activity (state sector versus outside), the source of funding (government 
versus household or private organisation) and the nature of the activity. Though the present 
article will distinguish public/private in terms of the social nature of educational activity, 
understandings of ‘public’ as state sector or government are encompassed in the approach.  
Second, the public/private distinction varies across the world according to political 
culture. Consider the differing understandings and practices of ‘public’, ‘private’, ‘society’ 
and ‘state’ in the Nordic realms, the German social market, Anglo-American societies with 
their limited liberal states, and the Chinese civilizational tradition with its strong family 
and comprehensive practice of state order. The public/private balance of costs differs in 
national systems often similar in other respects (OECD, 2014, 260-276), reflecting varied 
assumptions about the responsibilities of governments, families and students. Differences 
between national jurisdictions are not explored in the article, but it develops a framework 
that can be tested in differing contexts. The conclusion will return to this point.  
Third, public/private is understood variously in social science, from economics to 
differing strands in political and communications theory (Marginson, 2007; 2011; 2013a).  
Fourth, in the last half century in Anglo-American social science there has been a 
sustained and influential assault on notions of the public good or public interest, which has 
partly obscured the public dimension in higher education and other sectors. The origins of 
this critique of the public good lie in the Cold War-era argument developed by Arrow 
(1951) and the public choice theorists (Buchanan and Tullock, 1962) that it is impossible 
to have a common public interest that transcends individual preferences. Buchanan pitched 
his work against what he called the ‘normative delusion, stemming from Hegelian 
idealism: the state was, somehow, a benevolent entity and those who made decisions on 
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behalf of the state were guided by considerations of the general or “public interest”’ (133). 
As he saw it individuals used politics to seek forms of justice and social organisation that 
upheld their personal interests. Political leaders might claim to be responsible to persons or 
causes other than themselves, but were not. Politics was essentially another market, and 
group decisions were the sum of individual decisions combined through a decision-making 
rule (Buchanan and Tullock, 1962, 12, 35, 95, 132, 284, 305-306, 314-315). While this 
position is by no means universally shared in social science it has left its mark in the 
neoliberal reduction of state policy agendas (Marginson, forthcoming). Thus in higher 
education, Anglo-American policy focuses on the private benefits for students/graduates, 
principally higher earnings, and on their individual choices and customer satisfaction. The 
emphasis on private benefits, consistent with the marketing ethos that has gripped many 
HEIs, is used to justify tuition regimes. The public dimension is defined narrowly in terms 
of a market economy in which individual benefits are paramount. Thus the master public 
role of HEIs is seen as their contribution to profitability, industry innovation and economic 
growth—even though government, more than industry, shapes notions of economic utility 
in higher education (Geiger and Sa, 2009, 209). Neoliberal governments have little appetite 
for defining, monitoring, measuring (where possible) and regulating jointly-consumed 
collective outcomes of education such as social literacy. Such outcomes are under-
recognised, under-funded and under-produced, reproducing their marginalisation.  
In the policy mainstream, just one collective social goal is widely maintained (albeit 
highly variable in application): the contribution of HEIs to social equity. Other public 
contributions are often seen as incidental spillovers from the provision of benefits for 
graduates rather than as policy objectives; part of higher education’s case for support, 
perhaps, but its own responsibility. This reduces the fiscal burdens of government but also 
reduces the scope for public agency and enhances the risk of non provision of public 
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goods. With the public role of higher education thus partly devolved downwards from 
system to institution, some HEIs maintain surprisingly strong public missions. In 
California in 2012-13, the University of California (UC) campuses at Berkeley and Los 
Angeles between them enrolled over 20,000 Pell grant students from families with incomes 
of less than $50,000 per year—more Pell grant students than the top sixteen United States 
(US) private universities combined (Dirks, 2015). In more than a quarter of those families 
neither parent had attended higher education (Rothblatt, 2012, 272). Not all universities 
can do this. They cannot substitute for states. They must look to their own sustainability, 
and unlike states cannot reorder whole systems to enhance joint benefits. They are less 
transparent and are not joined to the full public through democratic mechanisms.  
 
Sequence of argument 
 
How then can social science bring the public dimension more effectively into view? This 
article focuses on two widely used disciplinary approaches to the public/private distinction, 
drawn from foundational economic theory and political theory respectively. The economic 
definition, exemplified here by Paul Samuelson (1954), distinguishes between non-market 
and market activities. The political definition, exemplified here by John Dewey (1927), 
distinguishes between state and non-state owned or controlled activities.  
After outlining both approaches to the public/private distinction the article combines 
them into an analytical framework for research and policy analysis in relation to higher 
education. It briefly reviews examples and applications, including global public goods. 
 
 
Samuelson’s non market/market distinction in economics 
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In ‘The pure theory of public expenditure’ Paul Samuelson (1954) established the notion of 
public/private now dominant in economic policy. Public goods are defined as one or both 
of non-rivalrous and non-excludable. Goods are non-rivalrous when they can be consumed 
by any number of people without being depleted, for example knowledge of a 
mathematical theorem, which sustains its use value indefinitely on the basis of free access. 
Goods are non-excludable when the benefits cannot be confined to individual buyers, such 
as clean air regulation. Private goods are neither non-rivalrous nor non-excludable. They 
can be produced, packaged and sold as individualised commodities in markets. Public 
goods and part-public goods cannot be produced on a profitable basis, and require 
government funding or philanthropic support. They do not necessarily require full 
government financing, and can be produced in either state or private institutions.  
Samuelson’s notion of public/private goods has led to variations, including common-
pool goods, rivalrous but non-excludable, such as a fishing zone; Buchanan’s (1965) ‘club 
goods’, excludable but non-rivalrous until congestion occurs; and Ostrom’s (2010) ‘toll 
goods’, whereby all but a specific population are excluded and the good is non-rivalrous 
within the group. Merit goods are goods produced in either the private or public sectors, 
that are rivalrous and excludable, but subsidized by government at point of use because it 
believes that otherwise the goods will under-consumed, for example because the private 
benefits are diffuse and long term. All these concepts have potential applications in higher 
education but discussion here will focus on the core public/private goods distinction.  
Though couched in generic terms, Samuelson’s definition is not universal, applying to 
all human societies. It embodies the norms of a capitalist society, consistent with the idea 
of an ‘institutional world’ divided between ‘private property exchanges in a market setting 
and government-owned property organized by a public hierarchy’ (Ostrom, 2010, 642). It 
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is not applicable to a gift economy (Mauss, 1954/1990), or an economy grounded in 
communal or state-controlled property and production. Among capitalist societies, it is 
most appropriate to Anglo-American nations that nurture the John Locke/Adam Smith 
notion of limited liberal states and a zero-sum opposition between private and public. In 
these nations the economic departments of state, like Samuelson, see private business as 
the default producer, except in cases of market failure of essential goods. This policy 
approach maximizes the scope for trade and capital accumulation, while providing a 
simple zero-sum basis for the private/ public split in financing goods such as higher 
education and research. Government funds the good to the extent of market failure, at 
which point the market takes over. Using the Samuelson framework, McMahon’s (2009) 
comprehensive survey of the research literature values the public contributions of 
universities at about 50 per cent of total expenditure. 
Samuelson’s definition of public/private correctly identifies market failure as the basis 
for fixing a minimum necessary level of public spending on education and research. 
However, his definition is a simplification that generates lacunae. First, the definition is 
ahistorical. It naturalises the definition of public/private. Whether a good is ‘public’ or 
‘private’ is seen as intrinsic to the nature of that good, universal, unchanging and unrelated 
to context. This is sometimes but not always right. It is right in relation to sunlight which is 
always a public good. It is wrong when the character of the good is shaped by politics or 
social arrangements, and can be either public or private, as happens in higher education.  
A second problem is the assumption of zero-sum, the idea that if a good is not public 
it must be private, and vice versa. Under some circumstances, public goods and private 
goods are not alternatives but additive. For example, basic research in universities, together 
with its connections to commercial and non-profit organisations, directly and indirectly 
generates both public and private goods in complex feedback loops (Hughes and Kitson, 
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2012). Likewise, graduates in medicine augment both their own earnings and the public 
welfare, and both kinds of benefit expand together. Polities differ on whether they finance 
HEIs on the basis of the zero-sum split between public and private costs and benefits 
suggested by Samuelson’s distinction, as in the United Kingdom (UK); or finance HEIs 
from taxation as a universal service, with private benefits seen as contained in the public 
benefit, as in Nordic systems. Whether zero-sum or positive-sum is a political choice. 
A third problem is that Samuelson’s definition is poorly equipped to deal with larger 
collective goods, which tend to fall outside economics, being difficult to border, observe, 
measure and value in terms of shadow prices. There is a strong element of the normative in 
many collective goods—for example, universities contribute to academic freedom because 
all believe it essential to universities. Samuelson’s naturalist formula cannot explicitly deal 
with normative aspects. However, the normative questions do not disappear. Economic 
identification of Samuelson public goods differs according to the normative assumptions of 
the economist. Neoliberal economists tend to downplay market failure and the scope for 
collective goods, or assume that private investment will generates the necessary public 
benefits as spillovers. Social democrats and endogenous growth theorists talk up the 
potentials of public goods and state investment (e.g. Romer, 1990). With the normative 
differences implicit rather than explicit, the conclusions are presented as the outcome of 
dispassionate science. This is unhelpful. It is better to make the policy choices explicit. 
The three problems are related. Despite Samuelson, market-produced goods and non-
market goods are not two sides of the same coin. They do not have the same ontology. 
Market-based private goods must be viable in current market transactions. Non-market 
public goods must be politically viable, are generated by many factors in addition to 
market failure, and often have a different temporality to market-based goods. Yet while 
Samuelson’s definition is too minimalist—especially by excluding positive-sum relations 
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between public and private—its narrow economic interest in scarcity and cost can be 
helpful. As well as establishing the minimum necessary public provision it provides a 
reflexive formula for interrogating the cost of any public provision beyond that boundary. 
You can have a more ‘public’ approach than minimally necessary, Samuelson implies, but 
there are opportunity costs. The same scarce resources could be allocated elsewhere.  
 
Economic public/private goods in higher education 
 
What public/private goods are produced in HEIs, in Samulelson’s terms?  
The most important non-market public good is knowledge. Since Adam Smith most 
economists have treated knowledge as a form or function of capital (Prendergast, 2010), 
but Stiglitz (1999) demonstrates that knowledge, as in the mathematical theorem, is a 
classic Samuelson public good. New knowledge is exclusive to its creator and provides a 
first mover advantage. Patents prolong that advantage. However, to be used knowledge 
must be communicated. Once communicated, essential knowledge retains its value no 
matter how often it is used. It is non rivalrous and non-excludable. Thus basic research is 
subject to market failure and is everywhere funded by government or philanthropy. It is 
true that the excludability of particular embodiments of knowledge, such as texts or 
artefacts, can be artificially maintained by property-based devices such journal pay-walls. 
However, privatisation is never fully successful because of ease of illegal reproduction. 
Education is more ambiguous. Student places in higher education can constitute either 
Samuelson private or public goods. Mostly, they are a (variable) mix of both. The public 
goods include individualised non-market benefits such as the better health outcomes and 
higher financial acumen of graduates (McMahon, 2009); and learned knowledge which is 
non-excludable and non-rivalrous. However, whenever university places confer value in 
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comparison with non participation, there is rivalry; and in HEIs with a surplus of 
applications over places, participation is excludable. A market in tuition becomes possible. 
The value of such private goods is maximized in programmes offering students positional 
opportunities to enter scarce careers of high value, such as elite preparation in Law and 
Medicine. These positional goods are zero-sum (Hirsch, 1976). If one person occupies a 
place in Harvard Law, others cannot have it. Yet the Ivy League also create public goods. 
For example MIT, Harvard and Stanford offer free public access to online course contents, 
without impairing the private vocational value of their face-to-face degrees and the 
associated status and networking benefits. 
Much depends on how higher education is organised. In highly stratified systems with 
tuition barriers, as in the US, the private good element is strong. In more universal and less 
competitive Nordic-style education, most graduates have similar standing, and places are 
less rivalrous and excludable (Valimaa, 2011). Nevertheless, all Nordic graduates still 
enjoy positional advantages over non-graduates, and there are scarce private goods of 
higher value in certain fields of training. The fact that their production is not formalised in 
a market reduces but does not wholly abolish value differentials.  
 
 
Political definitions of public/private 
 
Some social goods, such as national defence, are intrinsically collective. They cannot be 
produced and consumed individually. Other collective goods, such as public health or 
elementary education, are collective because societies want them to be. Either way, 
collective goods often become matters for combined decision-making and government 
regulation. Potentially the ambit of political determination is still broader than this. 
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Samuelson’s naturalistic distinction does not adequately acknowledge the role of political 
norms, politically processes and policy choices in deciding what is private, what is public, 
and the balance between them. This extends beyond the terrain of non market goods to 
include all goods subject to a political logic rather than, or as well as, an economic logic. It 
includes the regulation and over-determination of economic markets.  
There are many notions of ‘public’ in political theory and the larger field of political 
discourse. One strand models ‘the public good’ as comprehensive and universal, though it 
is difficult to make that work in empirical terms. Another concept is that of ‘the commons’, 
a resource shared by all and not subject to scarcity (Mansbridge, 1998), though most open 
social resources are vulnerable to congestion. A third concept, the ‘public sphere’ adjacent 
to the state, is discussed below. However, the arguably central idea of public in political 
theory derives from the state/non-state distinction. Though this is subject to many readings, 
John Dewey (1927) provides an influential definition of public/private as state/non-state. 
 
Dewey’s state/non-state distinction 
 
In The Public and its Problems (1927) Dewey notes that while most social transactions fall 
within the private sphere, some relational matters are understood as ‘public’, matters of 
broad ’public interest’, and addressed by a community of persons (a ‘public’). A social 
transaction can become ‘public’ when it has indirect consequences for others, persons 
outside the group immediately involved in the transaction. ‘The public’ is all persons 
indirectly or potentially affected (p. 39), whether the consequences of the transaction are 
positive or negative. For example, if an epidemic breaks out in one city, persons across the 
country are potentially affected. It becomes a matter of public health and common action: 
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The line between public and private is … drawn on the basis of the extent and scope 
of the consequences of acts which are so important as to need control, whether by 
inhibition or by promotion… The public consists of all those who are affected by the 
indirect consequences of transactions to such an extent that it is deemed necessary to 
have these consequences systematically cared for (Dewey, 1927, 15-16). 
 
 Dewey’s democratic idea of ‘public’, which was pitched against fascism and 
Stalinism emerged from the American participatory civic tradition. His antidote for 
coercive authority was ‘a social process of open-minded collective deliberation’ and 
rational decision-making within a shared culture (Amadae, 2003, 130), in which public 
opinion cohered in semi-participatory media, political parties and public meetings. The 
relational consequences of matters deemed ‘public’ then become ‘cared for’ by specific 
measures and agencies. This, he argues, is the basis for the state. However, a matter only 
becomes fully public, subject to government policy and regulation, if two successive 
decisions are made—(a) to treat it as a public relational matter, (b) to address it through 
government. Not all relational matters with consequences are regulated (e.g. growth of the 
Internet). Some identifiably public relational matters are managed by organisations other 
than state agencies (e.g. religious bodies, media firms, private universities). Dewey also 
notes that ‘public’ is not an unambiguous good. Not all matters sanctioned by public 
opinion and addressed by government contribute to sociability, or equity, or common 
benefits. Majorities are not always right. For example, states may wage aggressive wars 
with broad-based support (Dewey, 1927, 14, 26 and 216). Public goods—and for that 
matter private goods—must still be judged in terms of their substantive contents. 
 How generic is Dewey’s idea of ‘public’? Is his notion of government plausible? In 
contrast with the public choice theory that followed, Dewey argued that while some state 
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officials seek power or rewards, people in public life are not necessarily driven by 
individual self-interest, as they are in economic markets (Dewey, 1927, 15, 21 and 30). In 
the US Buchanan’s idea of politics as just another market has legitimated the plutocratic 
capture of government (Stiglitz, 2013). Politicians are owned by corporations who finance 
their campaigns, public servants exchange favours for cash, and in the ‘House of Cards’ it 
all seems normal. But are these inevitable attributes of states? Worldwide observation of 
overnment suggests that Dewey rather than Buchanan is right. A range of  behaviours are 
on show. Government is neither intrinsically high-minded nor intrinsically corrupted. Even 
in the US the neo-liberal displacement should not be overstated. Government is at least 
intermittently accountable from below. With concerted effort an organised public can 
make higher education a matter of common public interest and state intervention. The 
political form of ‘public, regulated by the state/non-state distinction, still has power. 
How well does Dewey’s argument apply in states that are not formally contestable in 
political terms? Not all HEIs are nested in American/European electoral democracies. In 
China and Singapore public opinion does not develop in the open civic forums imagined 
by Dewey, but both states are sensitive to society, especially middle class opinion, and 
tailor their educational and labour market opportunities accordingly (Goodman, 2014). In 
the 3000-year old Chinese civilizational tradition the state is responsible for social 
prosperity and order. When it falters in that task the state loses popular consent. More 
generally, Dewey’s idea of public can be stretched to include the many cases, in all 
societies, when government anticipates the relational consequences of social phenomena, 
prior to being sensitivised by active popular politics and participatory forums. Dewey’s 
idea wholly falls down only in regimes where government is chronically indifferent to 
popular opinion. Few political regimes survive long-term on that basis.  
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The public interest in higher education 
 
What then is the public/private character of higher education, using Dewey’s political 
definition of ‘public’? For Samuelson higher education is public in nature only if it cannot 
operate in a market. For Dewey any or all aspects of higher education can be public or 
private. Potentially, education or research are matters of public consequence when they 
affect enough people. Even private higher education operating on a commercial basis is a 
matter of public interest if people and government determine that it should be.  
In nearly all higher education systems—the US and UK are partial exceptions—HEIs 
are seen as public agencies. The political definition creates open scope for policy norms 
and political choices. It is more effective than Samuelson’s economic definition in 
identifying and regulating collective goods such as social equity in universities. This does 
not mean that all public aspects of higher education should be state driven. In most higher 
education systems, government formally devolves many matters to HEIs themselves. As 
noted, what varies is the extent to which devolution is nested in system-level policy goals. 
 
The university as public sphere 
 
Habermas (1989) identifies a ‘public sphere’ located between civil society and the state. 
His example is late seventeenth century London with its salons, coffee houses and 
broadsheets that together constituted public opinion and provided a critical reflexivity for 
the government of the day. Building on Habermas, Calhoun (1992) finds that universities 
operate in analogous fashion as semi-independent adjuncts of government, providing 
constructive criticism and strategic options, and expert information that helps state and 
public to reach considered opinions. Pusser (2006) models the university as a zone of 
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reasoned argument and contending values, noting that US higher education has been a 
medium for successive political and socio-cultural transformations, such as the 1960s civil 
rights movement. These notions of public, that rest on the state/non-state distinction while 
complexifying ‘state’, have resonance in China, There the leading national universities 
perform a corresponding role inside the party-state, as a space of criticism connected to 
power (Yang, 2009; Zha, 2011). Peking University was the starting point for most 
twentieth century Chinese political movements, including Tiananmen in 1989.  
Because of its advanced capacity to form self-altering agents and engender critical 
intellectual reflexivities (Castoriadis, 1987, 372); and also because of the way it facilitates 
movement across boundaries; at times, in both East and West, higher education has 
incubated advanced democratic forms. This suggests that one test of a ‘public’ university is 
the extent to which it provides space for criticism, challenge and new public formations.  
Habermas’s public sphere is communication based; and some theorists define ‘public’ 
as a network of public and private organisations that constitute a common communicative 
space (e.g. Castells, 2000; Drache, 2008; Cunningham, 2012). Like Dewey’s democratic 
public, or Habermas’s public sphere such ‘quasi-publics’ are mediums for identifiable 
communities in which opinion is exchanged—higher education and especially research 
nurtures many such networked communities—but unlike the Dewey and Habermas notions 
the ‘quasi-publics’ not defined by reference to a state. This overlaps with the more diffuse 
and ambiguous notion of civil society (Alexander, 2006), where the public/private 
boundary dissolves and the market is sometimes included, sometimes not.  
 
 
Combining the economic and political approaches 
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Each of the principal definitions of public/private has virtues and also lacunae. The 
economic approach to ‘public’, focusing on the non-market/market distinction, is stronger 
with individual level goods than collective goods. The political approach, focusing on the 
state/non-state distinction, is stronger in handling collective public goods, normative 
aspects and the public good (singular). The economic definition identifies the minimum 
necessary public goods, but posits a zero-sum relation between public and private, and 
constrains the policy choices. The political definition makes the public/private relation a 
political choice, not a natural event, enabling zero-summism to be set aside. It is more 
comfortable in the normative domain—the public is what the public says it is. But it tends 
to lack precision and has no limits. Dewey’s understanding of public is usefully subjected 
to the discipline of the economic approach based on scarcity and costs.  
The non-market/market dual, and the state/non-state dual, are heterogeneous. Hitherto 
they have been seen as separated (or in the imperial imagining of master-disciplines, one 
approach has been seen as superstructure of the other). Arguably, however, the two notions 
of public/private are intertwined in the practice; and each contributes to understanding the 
dynamics of public and private, each fills a gap in the other, and each provides a critical 
reflexivity for interrogating the other. All of this suggests that the public dimension of 
higher education is clarified by drawing the two definitions together, while giving each 
definition equal weight, and maintaining the distinction between them. Figure 1 does this.  
 
 
[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Source: author 
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A framework for analysing higher education and research 
 
Figure 1 is arranged on two axes, based on the state/non-state distinction (vertical axis) and 
the non-market/market distinction (horizontal axis). This naturally produces four 
quadrants, which represent four different political economies of higher education. 
Educational or research activity can be positioned on this diagram, according to the extent 
it is public (non-market) in Samuelson’s economic sense and thus positioned in Quadrants 
1 or 2; and the extent it is public in Dewey’s political sense (recognised as a matter of 
common interest and state control) and thus positioned in Quadrants 2 or 3. Education and 
research that is publicly funded (an economic public good) may be closely state controlled 
in Quadrant 2, or government funded into civil society in Quadrant 1. Activity that is state 
controlled (a political public good) may be produced on a non-market basis in Quadrant 2 
or run on a market basis with competition and mixed funding in Quadrant 3. The ‘pure’ 
public quadrant, combing the economic and political approaches, is Quadrant 2.  
Two ambiguous categories of public and private have now been replaced by four 
unambiguous categories. In both research and policy, the four distinctive political 
economies allow the comparison and contrast between different kinds of education and 
research to emerge clearly, facilitating identification of the relevant political economic 
dynamics, and empirical observation and measurement. Figure 1 makes explicit the 
political choices associated with economic provision, for example whether to produce and 
distribute higher education as a universal non market good; or on a competitive market 
basis, and if so whether to use state-controlled quasi markets, the most common approach, 
in Quadrant 3 or fully commercial markets in Quadrant 4. It also highlights the question of 
who should pay, whether the state through taxation or the individual beneficiaries. In 
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matters defined as public in the political sense, it poses the question ‘how public can we 
afford to be?’ in economic terms. 
Each quadrant includes examples of educational and research activity typical of that 
quadrant. If the test of an analytical framework is the extent to which it brings real world 
activity into view, Figure 1 does well. It provides comprehensive coverage of higher 
education. Inevitably, however, some activities are positioned on boundaries between 
quadrants, moving between quadrants over time, or located in more than one quadrant.  
Real life higher education systems, and individual HEIs, are not solely located in one 
quadrant, Some have activity in all four quadrants. The balance varies. For example much 
Nordic system activity falls in the social democratic Quadrant 2, combining non-market 
and state-organised approaches, though there are some competitive mechanisms of 
Quadrant 3 type. The more marketised American system is strong in Quadrants 3 and 4, 
but mixes this with economic and political public goods in Quadrant 2, and like other 
systems includes some production in Quadrant 1. Habermasian public sphere activity is in 
Quadrants 1 and 2. This includes collective student activism in Quadrant 1. 
 
Quadrant 1 (civil society)  
 
Quadrant 1 identifies non-market goods produced outside state control. As also in 
Quadrant 2, research and education are non-rivalrous and non-excludable, Samuelson 
public goods. The naming of this quadrant is controversial because in contrast with some 
other analyses, here ‘civil society’ is demarcated from both state and economic market. 
However, while Quadrant 1 is a private domain it is not an individual or family domain 
separate from society. It is a relational and communicative domain that includes social 
networks (social capital) sustained through universities (Bourdieu, 1986). The distinction 
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between private and public is not equivalent to the distinction between individual and 
society (Dewey, 1927, 69, 186). Any relationship between two or more people is ‘social’. 
Most social association is in the private realm. 
Faculty and students pursue unpaid and unregulated activities in Quadrant 1 between 
more formal agendas elsewhere. Open research knowledge has multiple relational 
consequences, it flows like water across all four quadrants, and is not politically public 
unless it is specifically publicly funded, and/or regulated, for example research evaluation.  
 
Quadrant 2 (social democracy)   
 
In Quadrant 2, the social democratic quadrant, Samuelson’s framework aligns with 
Dewey—public in the sense of state or government coincides with public in the sense of 
not-market. Quadrant 2 combines non-market economic public goods with political public 
goods, shaped and largely financed by public processes and government. Government 
manages teaching/learning on the basis of universal quality rather than market-induced 
stratification of quality as in Quadrants 3 and 4. In the most egalitarian version of Quadrant 
2, tuition is free, all quality high, all degrees have significant value, and selectivity has a 
modest role. Quadrant 2 research is supported from general university funding. Projects are 
determined by curiosity and merit, not competitive acumen or university status. In non-
market production in universities there is no natural limit to the volume and quality of 
output except absolute labour time. There are merely opportunity costs, when one action is 
chosen over another. However, governments may direct or influence production.  
The border between Quadrants 1 and 2 is active. Some educational functions are 
‘public’ in the sense of public consensus (Quadrant 2) but carried out by civil organisations 
(Quadrant 1) rather than public agencies. For example, German vocational education is a 
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‘system of semipublic self-government’ in which the ‘social partners’, business and labour 
unions, ‘assign public responsibilities to private training firms’ (Hansen, 2011, p. 34). 
 
Quadrant 3 (state quasi-market)   
 
In the neoliberal policy era a growing proportion of higher education activity is moved 
from Quadrants 1 and 2 to Quadrant 3. Quasi-markets combine market goods characterised 
by excludability and some rivalry, with the public functions of government. The common 
element across all Quadrant 3 is government-driven competition. However, very few 
quasi-markets are fully profit-driven (Marginson, 2013b). Education is subject to tuition 
fees, policy makers emphasise the private benefits, but student places are partly subsidised. 
Research projects follow commodity-like product formats yet they remain government 
funded as well as controlled. Research grant programmes often sit on the border of 
Quadrants 2 and 3. At its highest tuition rates state education moves close to Quadrant 4. 
 In the neoliberal era economic and political definitions of public/private have diverged 
because of the shift to quasi-markets in Quadrant 3, economically private but politically 
public. Thus there is a permanent state of tension in Quadrant 3. Under government 
control, it never fully satisfies the advocates of full-blown market reform, yet the 
expectations created by its politically public character (its proximity to Quadrant 2) are 
continually undermined by the market dynamic. If HEIs were fully commercialised they 
would be in Quadrant 4 and Samuelson and Dewey would again align, evaporating the 
tension. However, this is impossible, because of the natural public good character of 
knowledge. It is also impossible politically. Too much is at stake for public and 
government, including social equity, to let higher education go (Marginson, 2013b). 
 
Page 20 of 32
URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/cshe
Studies in Higher Education
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review Only
 21
Quadrant 4 (commercial market) 
 
In Quadrant 4 private market goods are also non-state controlled. The state is not entirely 
absent, as commercial transactions are regulated by commercial law, just as civil society in 
Quadrant 1 is regulated by civil and criminal law. Quadrant 4 houses commercial research 
and consultancy, and for-profit degrees including international education in non-profit UK 
and Australian universities. Some commercial activity is closely regulated or subsidised, 
falling on the Quadrant 3/4 border. For example, US for-profit colleges are more than 80 
per cent subsidised by federal student loans (Mettler, 2014).  
 
Social equality as public good 
 
The policy focus on equity in higher education, which is heterogeneous to economic 
policy, indicates the continuing importance of the democratic political notion of a common 
‘public interest’ in which all are seen to have a stake. Much rests on how equity is 
understood and practiced. In the English-speaking nations, educational equity in 
universities is mostly seen in terms of individual access to private economic benefits 
within stratified systems. However, equity also goes to questions of system organisation, 
which affect how socially inclusive are HEIs, how socially stratified, entry and patterns of 
completion by social group, and the extent to which HEIs facilitate upward social mobility 
(Corak, 2012). Social equity in higher education is a keystone collective benefit of 
Quadrant 2 type that underpins the potential for many other public and private goods.  
All else being equal, a move from Quadrants 2 to 3 enhances institutional 
stratification, financial barriers and social inequality in patterns of use, unless government 
compensates for the unequalising effects of starting disadvantage and its reproduction 
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through systemic and financial stratification (Marginson, 2016). Across all countries, 
places that offer significant positional advantage tend to be captured by students from 
affluent families best able to compete (Shavit, Arum and Gamoran, 2007). HEIs can 
reinforce starting social inequalities through a process of ‘cumulative advantage’ (DiPrete 
and Eirich, 2006). Note, however, that economic public goods in Quadrant 2 can be 
captured by privileged social groups, just like economic private goods in Quadrants 3 or 4. 
Even in systems where tuition is free and the ethos is inclusive and egalitarian, leading 
families with the best cultural resources for academic competition may dominate access to 
high demand programmes. It is always necessary to ask the question ‘whose public 
goods?’ Democratic political processes should optimise the egalitarian distribution of 
economic public goods, but there are no guarantees.  
Positional goods are never solely private goods in the political sense, especially high 
value places that are limited relative to demand—even if they are private goods in the 
economic sense, provided in private universities. When one person gains access to these 
goods and others are denied access, this shapes the pattern of social power and economic 
rewards, affecting all students and families. Intense economic competition for status goods 
with a ceiling on distribution also generates waste (Cooper, et al., 2001). These matters of 
relational public ‘consequences’, in Dewey’s sense, lend themselves to politicisation and 
state regulation. Ironically, the same relational qualities that enable high value education to 
be produced as Samuelson private goods also open it to public political intervention. This 
is one of the reasons why educational politics are perpetually contested and unstable. 
 
Global public goods 
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A range of multilateral political processes operate in the global space, and global policy 
organisations such as the World Bank, OECD and agencies of the United Nations can 
affect many nations. These organisations respond to groups and interests from many 
countries.  However, global public production is limited by the absence of a global state 
capable of the Dewey-an resolution of cross-border matters with relational consequences. 
No doubt this leads to under-recognition of the contribution of higher education-produced 
global public goods, and under-provision (Marginson, Murphy and Peters, 2010).  
In the global sphere only one public/private distinction is relevant, Samuelson’s 
economic distinction. In this respect gobal public goods are ‘goods that have a significant 
element of non-rivalry and/or non-excludability and are made broadly available across 
populations on a global scale. They affect more than one group of countries’ (Kaul, 
Grunberg and Stern, 1999, 2-3). Nations differ in the extent to which they contribute to and 
benefit from global public goods that are carried by cross-border flows of knowledge, 
ideas and people and generated in education and research. For example, the content of 
global knowledge flows is linguistically and culturally dominated by certain countries, 
especially the United States. This again raises a question of ‘whose public goods?’ For 
faculty who speak, say, Spanish, then English as the single common global language is a 
public good in the sense that it facilitates the relational environment, but a public bad (a 
negative global externality) to the extent that it maginalises knowledge in the Spanish 
language at global level. It can devalue that knowledge even in Spanish speaking settings, 
for example in local science communities. Developing countries may experience net brain 
drain of research personnel to the global metropolis, another global public bad.  
At the same time there are many informal global communicative publics that span 
borders, including a plethora of such relations in the university sector. Global ‘quasi-
publics’ include the communicative networks of Google and Facebook and others, sitting 
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on the border between Quadrants 1 and 4 but with nascent political potential. However, 
inclusions in global community are relatively weak—ties are not as strong as in a national 
polity—and ‘public’ matters in this sense do not necessarily translate into concerted action. 
A communications company is not a state. It is not obliged to respond to opinion, though it 
will be commercially sensitive to it. Yet these non-state publics, which freely cross the 
borders between national polities, also influence nation-states. Likewise, cross-border 
relations between universities have moved out ahead of nation-to-nation relations. It is not 
clear whether and how that the political shaping of global public goods will catch up.  
 
 
Conclusions and next steps 
 
The economic definition of public/private in higher education, based on the non-
market/market distinction, subjects politically-defined public goods to tests of limited 
resources and costs. ‘How publicly generous should higher education provision be?’ it 
asks. The political definition of public/private in higher education, based on the state/non-
state distinction, subjects economically-defined public and private goods to tests of values, 
norms, social relations and system design. ‘Public and collective forms of provision can 
change the nature of the goods, for example their social equity’, it says. ‘What kind of 
society do you want?’ The response is: ‘To the extent your preferred social arrangement is 
subject to market failure, government finances it. Is it affordable?’ Public and private 
goods are heterogeneous in use values, yet can be combined within one system of 
monetary value. Together, the economic and political modes constitute a more explanatory 
and more instrumental framework for operationalising the public/private distinction in 
higher education, than either the economic or political mode can provide alone. 
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 In sum, the political economic nature of higher education and research are determined 
by whether market competition is used for coordination, and/or whether activity is located 
or closely controlled in the state sector. Here the ‘state sector ‘includes both legally owned 
state agencies and those nominally private agencies that are so controlled by the state as to 
be equivalent to state-owned agencies. The latter include regulated and government-funded 
private higher education sectors or institutions in some countries, such as the UK 
universities, now nominally private in the legal sense but in continuity with their erstwhile 
public forebears. The question of funding is secondary to public/private character. High 
fee-charging is symptomatic of market relationships (Quadrants 3 or 4) but low fees that 
do not signify competition or access barriers are compatible with lower Quadrant 2. While 
government funding is essential in Quadrant 2, it is normally present, on a variable basis, 
in Quadrant 3, and there can be public subsidies for commercial activity in Quadrant 4.  
 At the same time, these issues look different from country to country. Systems vary in 
the extent to which they produce education or research as private goods in the economic 
sense of market goods. sense. Nations also vary in which aspects of higher education 
receive political attention and state regulation; in the collective goods they expect from 
HEIs; and in their philosophical understanding of the relational ‘public’.  By comparing 
different approaches to both non-market and politically public activity in higher education, 
on an empirical basis, it may be possible to develop a multi-positional (Sen, 1992) generic 
language of public/private that is grounded in unity-in-diversity. This in turn could 
facilitate recognition of, and production of, not just national but global public goods in 
university education and research. These are the next steps in the present inquiry.  
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Figure 1. Combining the economic and political definitions 
of public/private goods in higher education:  
Four Quadrants, four political economies of higher education  
 
 
 
Source: author 
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